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Abstract
Using social media for political discourse is becoming com-
mon practice, especially around election time. One interest-
ing aspect of this trend is the possibility of pulsing the pub-
lic’s opinion about the elections, and that has attracted the
interest of many researchers and the press. Allegedly, pre-
dicting electoral outcomes from social media data can be fea-
sible and even simple. Positive results have been reported,
but without an analysis on what principle enables them.
Our work puts to test the purported predictive power of so-
cial media metrics against the 2010 US congressional elec-
tions. Here, we applied techniques that had reportedly led
to positive election predictions in the past, on the Twitter data
collected from the 2010 US congressional elections. Unfortu-
nately, we ﬁnd no correlation between the analysis results and
the electoral outcomes, contradicting previous reports. Ob-
serving that 80 years of polling research would support our
ﬁndings, we argue that one should not be accepting predic-
tions about events using social media data as a black box. In-
stead, scholarly research should be accompanied by a model
explaining the predictive power of social media, when there
is one.
Introduction
A substantial amount (22%) of adult internet users were en-
gaged with the electoral campaigns through online social
networks during the November 2010 US elections (Smith
2011). This percentage will likely increase, thus, researchers
are trying to make sense of the data produced on these
channels. It has been reported that the volume of Twitter
chatter can be used to predict metrics such as movie suc-
cess (Asur and Huberman 2010), marketability of consumer
goods (Shimshoni, Efron, and Matias 2009), and even the
voting results in the 2009 German elections (Tumasjan et al.
2010).
The latter should be surprising given the differences in the
demographics of likely voters and social media users (Smith
2011), and it could be that such results were just a matter of
coincidence, not easily repeatable.
Our work here aims to test the predictive power of Twitter
metrics against several races of the recent US Congressional
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elections. Our main conclusion is that such predictions so
far have proven to be not better than chance, thus, exposing
the limits of predictability of elections by means of social
media data.
“Predicting the Present” with Social Media
The idea that what people are blogging or searching about
can provide a glimpse on the collective psyche is very ap-
pealing. Since most of the online social media services
provide APIs, such data can be collected allowing us to
test this hypothesis. Clearly, making predictions from such
data would have numerous beneﬁts in the areas of public
health (e.g. (Ginsberg et al. 2009), (Lampos, Bie, and Cris-
tianini 2010)), business (e.g. (Asur and Huberman 2010),
(Shimshoni, Efron, and Matias 2009)), economics (e.g.
(Bollen, Mao, and Zeng 2010), (Choi and Varian 2009)),
and politics (e.g. (O’Connor et al. 2010), (Tumasjan et al.
2010)).
Have Social Media Data predicted the Elections?
The promising results achieved by the studies above have
created some hype surrounding the feasibility of predicting
electoral results from social media. Most of this hype is fu-
eled by traditional media and blogs, bursting prior and after
electoral events. Shortly after the recent 2010 elections in
the US, bold statements made it to the headlines. From those
arguing that Twitter is not a reliable predictor (e.g. (Gold-
stein and Rainey 2010)) to those claiming just the opposite,
that Facebook and Twitter were remarkably accurate (e.g.
(Carr 2010)).
Compared to the media coverage, the number of schol-
arly works on the topic is relatively small, although it tends
to support a positive opinion on the predictive power of so-
cial media. Thus, according to (Williams and Gulati 2008),
the number of Facebook fans constitutes an indicator of can-
didate viability of signiﬁcant importance in races of vari-
ous types (though it reportedly failed to predict a substantial
number of races in the US 2010 elections (Facebook 2010)).
(O’Connor et al. 2010) described mixed results: sim-
ple sentiment analysis methods on Twitter data exhibited
a rather high correlation with the index of Presidential Job
Approval, but the correlation was not signiﬁcant when com-
pared with pre-electoral polls for the US 2008 presidential
race. At the same time, the work by (Tumasjan et al. 2010)
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directly addressed the question of predicting elections from
Twitter data, and concluded with a strong statement, namely
that “the mere number of tweets mentioning a political party
can be considered a plausible reﬂection of the vote share and
its predictive power even comes close to traditional election
polls.”
The reader may have noted some contradiction in the pa-
pers mentioned above. Twitter volume data were supposedly
able to predict electoral results in Germany in 2009 with
amazing accuracy (Tumasjan et al. 2010), yet more elab-
orated methods did not correlate with pre-electoral polls in
the US (O’Connor et al. 2010). Naive sentiment analysis and
frequency counts seem to be enough in one case, but come
short in another. Could it be that past promising results were
just a matter of chance?
Two very recent studies provide a critical view on this
topic. They do not claim that electoral predictions from so-
cial data are unfeasible, but that they are more difﬁcult to
obtain than one could expect from previous studies. (Lui,
Metaxas, and Mustafaraj 2011) focused on the use of Web
search volume as a predictor for the 2008 and 2010 US Con-
gressional elections. They found that Google Trends cor-
rectly “predicted” one group of races, but that such predic-
tions were neither consistent (i.e. group correctly predicted
for 2008 obtained poor predictions for 2010), nor compe-
tent compared to predictions by incumbency1. In fact, they
report that using incumbency as a baseline, Web search vol-
ume seems to be a poor electoral predictor.
(Gayo-Avello 2011) applied some of the recently pub-
lished research methods to a set of tweets obtained during
the US 2008 Presidential elections. He found that every pub-
lished method would have grossly overestimated Obama’s
victory to the point of predicting a win even in Texas. In
addition, he points out that demographic bias is a key caveat
when relying on social media data.
More Experiments on Twitter and Elections
We decided to do some more work in order to put to the
test the claims of predictability of election results through
analysis of Twitter data. For our study, two data sets related
to elections in the US during 2010 were employed. Pre-
dictions were computed according to Twitter chatter volume
as in (Tumasjan et al. 2010) and sentiment analysis as in
(O’Connor et al. 2010). Then, the predictions were com-
pared against the actual election results. The mean average
error (MAE) was rather high: 17.1% for the Twitter volume
and 7.6% for the sentiment analysis. By comparison, MAE
for professional polling services is typically about 2-3%.
To understand whether sentiment analysis was really per-
forming better, several tests were carried out including man-
ual labeling of tweets, and comparing the political prefer-
ence of individual users as inferred by means of sentiment
analysis with their presumed political orientation derived
from the politicians they followed in Twitter.
1Incumbents (the candidates who currently hold ofﬁce) do re-
markably well in elections, getting re-elected about 85% of the
time, as shown in (Lui, Metaxas, and Mustafaraj 2011).
Data Sets
The ﬁrst data set belongs to the 2010 US Senate special elec-
tion in Massachusetts (“MAsen10”), a race between demo-
crat Martha Coakley and republican Scott Brown (see also
(Metaxas and Mustafaraj 2010)). It contains 234,697 tweets
by 56,165 different users. It was collected from January 13
to 20, 2010, using the Twitter streaming API, conﬁgured to
retrieve tweets containing the names of any of the two can-
didates. The second data set2 contains all the tweets pro-
vided by the Twitter gardenhose in the week of October 26
to November 1, before the general US Congressional elec-
tions on November 2, 2010 (“USsen10”). Filtering with the
names of candidates for ﬁve contested races for the Senate,
we found 13,019 tweets by 6,970 different users.
Methods of Prediction
We used the methods by (Tumasjan et al. 2010) and
(O’Connor et al. 2010) with some slight changes, in order
to account for differences in the nature of electoral races
(e.g., German elections had 5 major parties all vying for
votes, American elections are based on “winner takes all”,
so a tweet cannot be counted as a vote for both opposing
candidates). So, while Tumasjan et al. seemed to count ev-
ery candidate (party name) mentioned, we did not include
tweets mentioning both competing candidates. With regards
to the method by O’Connor et al., we used the same po-
larity lexicon to ﬁnd positive, negative, and neutral words.
Our modiﬁcation consists in the following: while they al-
low a tweet to be both positive and negative, we consider
it to be only one of the three options (positive, negative, or
neutral) depending on the sum of labeled words. Then, the
predicted vote share for a candidate c1, was computed tak-
ing advantage of the bipartisanship nature of the races, using
this formula:
pos(c1) + neg(c2)
pos(c1) + neg(c1) + pos(c2) + neg(c2)
(1)
In the Equation 1, c1 is the candidate for whom support is
being computed while c2 is the opposing candidate; pos(c)
and neg(c) are, respectively, the number of positive and
negative tweets mentioning candidate c. Notice that neutral
tweets were not used, since they don’t express a preference
for a candidate.
Results of the Prediction Methods
Amore detailed analysis was possible for the MAsen10 data
set since it contained tweets before the election day (6 days
of data), on the election day (20 hours of data), and post-
election (10 hours of data). Table 1 shows the number of
tweets mentioning each candidate and the election results
predicted accordingly. While the total number of tweets
(containing post-result tweets) closely reﬂects the election
outcome, the share volume for the pre-election period, in-
correctly predicted a win for Coakley. On the other hand,
2The Twitter data for the November, 2010 election is courtesy
of the Center for Complex Networks and Systems Research at the
Indiana University School of Informatics and Computing.
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State Senate Race Election Result Normalized Result Twitter Volume Sentiment Analysis
MA Coakley [D] vs. Brown[R] 47.1% - 51.9% 47.6% - 52.4% 53.9% - 46.1% 46.5% - 53.5%
CO Bennet [D] vs Buck [R] 48.1% - 46.4% 50.9% - 49.1% 26.3% - 73.7% 63.3% - 36.7%
NV Reid [D] vs Angle [R] 50.3% - 44.5% 53.1% - 46.9% 51.2% - 48.8% 48.4% - 51.6%
CA Boxer [D] vs Fiorina [R] 52.2% - 44.2% 54.1% - 45.9% 57.9% - 42.1% 47.8% - 52.2%
KY Conway [D] vs Paul [R] 44.3% - 55.7% 44.3% - 55.7% 4.7% - 95.3% 43.1% - 56.9%
DE Coons [D] vs O’Donnell [R] 56.6% - 40.0% 58.6% - 41.4% 32.1% - 67.9% 38.8% - 61.2%
Table 2: The summary of electoral and predicted results for 6 highly contested senate races. Numbers in bold show races where
the winner was predicted correctly by the technique. Both Twitter Volume and Sentiment Analysis methods were able to predict
correctly 50% of the races. In this sample, incumbents won in all the races they run (NV, CA, CO), and 85% of all 2010 races.
Coakley Brown
#tweets % #tweets %
Pre-elec. (6 days) 52,116 53.86 44,654 46.14
Elec. day (20 hrs) 21,076 49.94 21,123 50.06
Post-elec. (10 hrs) 14,381 29.74 33,979 70.26
Total 87,573 46.75 99,756 53.25
Table 1: The share of tweets for each candidate in the
MAsen10 data set. Notice that the pre-election share didn’t
predict the ﬁnal result (Brown won by 52%).
applying sentiment analysis and Equation 1 we get a differ-
ent picture. In this case, pre-election volume seems to be a
good prediction for this election.
Both prediction techniques were also applied to ﬁve more
highly contested senate races from the USsen10 data set (see
Table 2). In summary, for the six evaluated races, the winner
was predicted correctly only half the time by each method.
In one occasion the two different methods agreed correctly,
and in an other agreed incorrectly.
Sentiment Analysis Accuracy
The mean average error (MAE) for the predictions was
17.1% for the Twitter volume method and 7.6% for the sen-
timent analysis method, outside the usual error-margin ac-
ceptable in election predictions. The MAE difference be-
tween the two methods was intriguing and we decided to
study it closer. Evidence on the issues affecting simple
polarity-based sentiment analysis methods was examined
from three different angles: (1) when compared against hu-
man judgment; (2) regarding the detection of misleading
propaganda; and (3) on relation to the presumed political
leaning of the users posting the tweets.
(1) From the users that had indicated their location in
the state of Massachusetts, we selected those with a single
tweet. This set contained 2,259 tweets and was manually
labeled according to the following criteria: opposing Brown
(ob), opposing Coakley (oc), supporting Brown (sb), sup-
porting Coakley (sc), or neutral (n). Then, these labels were
compared against those assigned by the automatic method,
revealing that the accuracy of the method is only marginally
better than a random classiﬁer.
(2) Given this poor result, an additional evaluation
was performed on a “Twitter bomb” targeted at Coakley
(Metaxas and Mustafaraj 2010). The bomb consisted of
a series of tweets spreading misleading information about
the democratic candidate. The automatic sentiment analysis
only ﬂagged 37% of them as negative. Thus, the subtleties
of propaganda and disinformation are not only missed, but
even interpreted incorrectly.
(3) An additional experiment was conducted to test the
assumption underlying this application of sentiment analy-
sis, namely, that the political preference of users can be de-
rived from their tweets. The presumed political orientation
was calculated following the approach described by (Gol-
beck and Hansen 2011)), in which a user receives the av-
erage ADA score3 of the Congress members he/she is fol-
lowing in Twitter. About half a million Twitter users follow
the Congress members with Twitter accounts and little more
than 14 thousand also appear in the MAsen10 dataset.
For each of these 14 thousand users four different scores
were computed: their ADA score, their opinion on Brown,
their opinion on Coakley, and their “voting orientation” for
this particular election. The latter three were computed from
their tweets using the sentiment analysis method. While
we cannot provide details here due to space limitations, we
report that, although the different scores correlated as ex-
pected, the correlations were weak.
From these experiments we conclude that the accuracy of
lexicon-based sentiment analysis when applied to political
conversation is quite poor: it just slightly outperforms a ran-
dom classiﬁer; it fails to ﬂag disinformation and misleading
propaganda; and, it’s a far cry from being able to predict
political orientation of the users.
Limits of Predictions using Social Media Data
Given the negative results we report above, one might sug-
gest that “you would have done better if you did a different
kind of analysis”. However, recall that we did not invent
new techniques of analysis that we used: We simply tried to
repeat what others have done and found that the results were
not repeatable. We argue that the problem is that, in the
past, some researchers have felt comfortable treating social
media as a black box: It may give you the right answer, even
though you may not know why. We believe that there is an
3ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) is a liberal, political
think-tank that publishes scores–ranging from 0 (most conserva-
tive) to 100 (most liberal)— for each member of the US Congress
according to their voting record in key progressive issues.
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opportunity for intellectual contribution if their methods are
accompanied with at least a basic reasonable model on why
they predict correctly. Below we argue why it should not
be surprising to ﬁnd weak or no correlations between social
media data and electoral predictions.
Predicting elections is something that professional poll-
sters have been doing for the last 80 years, a mathematically
proven application of correctly identifying likely voters and
getting an un-biased representative sample of them. Today’s
social media do not seem ﬁt to do this. To make this point
clear, two arguments are outlined (due to lack of space):
First, we note that the complexity of professional polling
cannot be duplicated by sampling social media data. Pro-
fessional pollsters sample “likely voters” (those who voted
in the previous elections), because it has been observed con-
sistently that not every adult who has the right to vote will
exercise it. In addition, sample results are age-adjusted be-
cause not every age group votes in the same proportion (Blu-
menthal 2004). There are no means of collecting this infor-
mation reliably through social media. Even if there were,
a really random sample of likely voters is still unattainable,
because only those who have decided to express their opin-
ion can be observed.
Second, social media allow manipulation by spammers
and propagandists. Fake accounts are easy to create and they
can be used to amplify the spammers message polluting the
data for any observer (Metaxas and Mustafaraj 2010).
Conclusions
This research has revealed that data from Twitter did no bet-
ter than chance in predicting results in the last US congres-
sional elections. We argue that this should be expected: So
far, knowledge of the exact demographics of the people dis-
cussing elections in social media is scant, while according
to the state-of-the-art polling techniques, correct predictions
require the ability of sampling likely voters randomly and
without bias. Moreover, answers to several pertinent ques-
tions are needed such as the actual nature of political con-
versation in social media, the relation between political con-
versation and electoral outcomes, and the way in which dif-
ferent ideological groups and activists engage and inﬂuence
online social networks.
Further research is needed regarding the ﬂaws of simple
sentiment analysis methods when applied to political con-
versation. In this sense, it would be very interesting to un-
derstand the impact of different lexicons and, even more im-
portant, to go one step further by using machine learning, as
in the work of (Asur and Huberman 2010); or looking for a
deeper understanding of the dynamics of political conversa-
tion in social media following the work of (Somasundaran
and Wiebe 2010).
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